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ARTICLE
RACE, SLAVERY, AND FEDERAL LAW,




This article suggests three things about our early constitutional his-
tory—the period before the Court decided Marbury v. Madison.1 While
most legal scholars think of constitutional law as being about the Supreme
Court, this article shows that most constitutional law in this period was a
result of actions by Congress and the executive, as those two branches of
the government implemented the new constitution. This article demon-
strates that, in this period, Congress and the executive branch implemented
and interpreted the Constitution in a way that protected slavery and under-
mined the liberty of free blacks.
First, we see that constitutional law in this early period was not court-
centered. This was true after Marbury as well as before. In the 1790s, Con-
gress and the executive branch made constitutional law as they interpreted,
constructed, and implemented the Constitution. It is perhaps too much to
expect this will be taught in Constitutional law courses, which are almost
always court-centered. But to the extent law schools train judges, legisla-
tors, and policy makers, it would be valuable to teach future lawyers that
the Constitution is not just a document for judges.
Second, this article shows that slavery was a controversial constitu-
tional issue from the very beginning of the nation. In a nation that struggles
over monuments to the Confederate States of America—a putative nation
* President of Gratz College, Melrose Park, Pa. I gave this as a paper for a symposium at
the University of St. Thomas School of Law while I held the Ariel F. Sallows Chair in Human
Rights Law at the University of Saskatchewan College of Law in 2016 and finished much of the
work on it while John E. Murray Visiting Chair at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law and
the Fulbright Chair in Human Rights and Social  Justice at the University of Ottawa School of
Law.  I thank the librarians at all three institutions for their help.
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
1
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-1\UST101.txt unknown Seq: 2 10-APR-18 12:01
2 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1
dedicated to slavery and white supremacy2—to the proposition that all men
are not created equal3—it is worth recalling how slavery also shaped the
early development of our Constitutional law. In this period, Congress
passed the first fugitive slave law,4 refused to consider legislation to prevent
the kidnapping of free blacks,5 prohibited free blacks or slaves from carry-
ing the mail from place-to-place,6 denied immigrant blacks the right to be-
come naturalized citizens,7 and prohibited free blacks from serving in the
military.8
I have not covered all the issues surrounding slavery and the Constitu-
tion in this period. Among those not covered are the extensive debates and
legislation over the regulation of the African slave trade in the period before
Marbury.9 Nor have I discussed how slavery was also central to debates
over foreign policy, including the Jay Treaty with Great Britain and policy
on Haiti.10 I also do not consider the extensive debates in Congress over
taxation and slavery that focused in part on the constitutional meaning of
direct taxes.11 A full discussion of these issues would require a book, not a
law review article.
Finally, this article raises important issues about modern constitutional
interpretation and what is generally called “intentionalism.” Slavery was at
the heart of many debates in the Constitutional Convention,12 as well as the
2. Paul Finkelman, States’ Rights, Southern Hypocrisy, and the Crisis of the Union, 45
AKRON L. REV. 449, 449–478 (2012).
3. See, e.g., Alexander H. Stephens, The Corner Stone Speech (Mar. 21, 1861), in HENRY
CLEVELAND, ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: WITH LETTERS AND SPEECHES,
BEFORE, DURING, AND SINCE THE WAR 717, 721 (1886) (“Our new government is founded . . . its
foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests upon the great truth, that the negro is not equal to the
white man; that slavery—subordination to the superior race—is his natural and normal condition.
This, our new government, is the first, in the history of the world, based upon this great physical,
philosophical, and moral truth.”).  At the time, Stephens was the Vice President of the Confederate
States.
4. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793) (repealed 1864).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 96–142.
6. Act of May 3, 1802, ch. 48, 2 Stat. 189, 191. (repassed in 1810) (altering and establishing
certain post roads and improving mail security); Act of Apr. 30, 1810, ch. 37, 2 Stat. 592 (regulat-
ing post office establishment). See infra text accompanying notes 69–87.
7. “An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization” (Naturalization Act of 1790),
Act of March 6, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103; “An act to establish an uniform rule of Naturaliza-
tion; and to repeal the act heretofore passed on that subject” (Naturalization Act of 1795), Act of
January 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 414.
8. Militia Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (1792) (amended 1862). See infra text
accompanying notes 63–68.
9. See DONALD L. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS,
1765–1820, at 295–346 (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1971); see also Paul Finkelman, The Ameri-
can Suppression of the African Slave Trade: Lessons on Legal Change, Social Policy, and Legis-
lation, 42 AKRON L. REV. 430, 433 (2009).
10. See ROBINSON, supra note 9, at 347–77; see also PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE
FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 171–172, 178–182, 215–216 (3d ed.
2014) [hereinafter FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS].
11. See generally ROBIN L. EINHORN, AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY (2006).
12. FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 10, at 3–36.
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constitutional debates before Marbury. Protecting slavery was also a central
aspect of the drafting and adoption of the U.S. Constitution. In many ways,
the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison was correct when he labeled the
Constitution “a covenant with death, an Agreement in hell.”13 The early
Congress, filled with founders, including James Madison, chose over and
over again to protect slavery and to reject any discussion of freedom or
emancipation. Representative William L. Smith of South Carolina argued
the House could not even debate these issues. And, he carried the House on
this point. Whether we like it or not, protection of slavery and a rejection of
liberty was the intention of a significant number of the Framers in 1787,
and they successfully carried this argument into the government in the
1790s and beyond. The founding generation created a slaveholder’s repub-
lic, and it is a legacy that has bedeviled the United States for more than two
centuries. This legacy is surely a caution on how we view their “intentions”
and whether we should venerate them.
I. THE FAILURE TO “SECURE THE BLESSING OF LIBERTY”
The Constitution’s Preamble proudly proclaimed it was “ordain[ed]
and establish[ed]” to “secure the Blessings of Liberty” to the American peo-
ple.14 But, in the area of race and slavery from 1789 until 1803, Congress
passed numerous laws that undermined liberty and strengthened slavery and
racism. These laws reflected some of the dictates of the Constitution but
also went beyond them. Thus, in the period before Marbury, Congress not
only grappled with the place of slavery and race under the new Constitution
but also enhanced and expanded the proslavery aspects of the Constitution.
Before turning to the legislation on race and slavery in this period, a
quick look at how the Constitution dealt with slavery and race is in order.
Although the Constitution of 1787 does not use the words slave or slavery,
the institution profoundly shaped the document and is embedded in it in a
variety of ways. In the end, the Convention avoided using the term “slave”
because it was expedient to do so. Northern delegates wanted to avoid an-
tagonizing their own constituents, who might support a stronger Union but
were hostile to slavery;15 southerners were ready to acquiesce on this point
13. Paul Finkelman, The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little Gained, 13 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 413, 445 (2001).
14. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
15. During the Convention, the framers used the terms “slave” and “negro” interchangeably,
but in the end, they used euphemisms at the request of some New England delegates who feared
that such explicit terminology would undermine ratification in their states. Connecticut’s Roger
Sherman, who voted with the Deep South to allow the trade, objected, not only to the singling out
of specific states, but also to the term “slave.” He declared that he “liked a description better than
the terms proposed,” which had been declined by the old Congresses and were not pleasing to
some people. George Clymer of Pennsylvania “concurred with Mr. Sherman” on this issue. 2 MAX
FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 415 (rev. ed. 1966) [hereinaf-
ter RECORDS].
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because the description was clear and unmistakable.16 But, despite the cir-
cumlocution, the Constitution directly sanctioned slavery in six provisions:
• Art. I, Sec. 2, Cl. 3. The “three-fifths clause” provided for
counting three-fifths of all slaves for purposes of representa-
tion in Congress. This clause also provided that, if any “direct
tax” was levied on the states, it could be imposed only propor-
tionately, according to population, and that only three-fifths of
all slaves would be counted in assessing what each state’s con-
tribution would be.
• Art. I, Sec. 9, Cl. 1. The “slave trade clause” prohibited Con-
gress from banning the “Migration or Importation of such Per-
sons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to
admit” before the year 1808. Awkwardly phrased and de-
signed to confuse readers, this clause prevented Congress from
ending the African slave trade before 1808 but did not require
Congress to ban the trade after that date. The clause was a
significant exception to the general power granted to Congress
to regulate all international commerce. However, while
preventing Congress from banning the trade before 1808, there
was no bar to regulating it.
• Art. I, Sec. 9, Cl. 4. The “capitation tax clause” insured that
any “capitation” or other “direct tax” had to take into account
the three-fifths clause. It ensured that if a head tax were ever
levied, slaves would be taxed at three-fifths the rate of free
people. The “direct tax” portion of this clause was redundant,
because that was provided for in the three-fifths clause.
• Art. II, Sec. 1, Cl. 2, provided for the indirect election of the
president through the electoral college, which was based on
congressional representation. This provision incorporated the
three-fifths clause into the electoral college and gave whites in
slave states a disproportionate influence in the election of the
president.17 At the Convention, James Madison made it clear
that this was necessary because otherwise the South “could
have no influence in the election on the score of the Ne-
groes.”18 This clause had a major impact on the politics of
slavery and American history. Thomas Jefferson’s victory in
the election of 1800 would be possible only because of the
electoral votes the southern states gained on account of their
slaves. Thus, Jefferson, who spent most of his career quietly
16. When he returned from the Philadelphia Convention, James Iredell explained to the
North Carolina ratifying convention that, “the word ‘slave’ is not mentioned” because “[t]he
northern delegates, owing to their particular scruples on the subject of slavery, did not choose the
word ‘slave’ to be mentioned.” 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CON-
VENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 176 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Burt Frank-
lin 1987) (1888).
17. See Paul Finkelman, The Proslavery Origins of the Electoral College, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1145 (2002).
18. 2 RECORDS, supra note 15, at 57.
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and privately protecting slavery while publicly trying to avoid
any conflict over slavery,19 was elevated to the presidency in
part because of slavery. In the context of this law review sym-
posium, Marbury would never have happened had it not been
for the proslavery electoral college.
• Art. IV, Sec. 2, Cl. 3. The “fugitive slave clause” prohibited
the states from emancipating fugitive slaves and required that
runaways be returned to their owners “on demand.” The
clause did not say how it should be implemented, or indeed, if
it required (or even allowed) Congressional implementation.
• Art. V. The amendment provisions prohibited any amendment
of the slave importation or capitation clauses before 1808.
Taken together, these six provisions gave the South a strong claim to “spe-
cial treatment” for its peculiar institution. The three-fifths clause also gave
the South extra political muscle—in the House of Representatives and in
the Electoral College—to support that claim.
Numerous other clauses of the Constitution supplemented the six
clauses that directly protected slavery. Some provisions that indirectly
guarded slavery, such as the prohibition on taxing exports,20 were included
primarily to protect the interests of slaveholders. Others, such as the guaran-
tee of federal support to “suppress Insurrections” were written with slavery
in mind, although delegates also supported them for reasons having nothing
to do with slavery. The most prominent indirect protections of slavery were:
• Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 15, empowered Congress to call “forth the
Militia” to “suppress Insurrections,” which included slave re-
bellions. This clause would be implemented to help suppress
Gabriel’s rebellion, the Nat Turner Rebellion, and John
Brown’s attempt to make war on slavery in Virginia.
• Art. I, Sec. 9, Cl. 5, prohibited federal taxes on exports and
thus prevented an indirect tax on slavery by taxing the prod-
ucts of slave labor, such as tobacco, rice, and, by the late
1790s, cotton.
• Art. I, Sec. 10, Cl. 2, prohibited the states from taxing exports
or imports, thus preventing an indirect tax on the products of
slave labor by a nonslaveholding state. This was especially
important to the slave states because almost all slave states
produced export products: tobacco, rice, and eventually cot-
ton, which were often shipped out of Northern ports.
• Art. IV, Sec. 3, Cl. 1, allowed for the admission of new states.
The delegates to the Convention anticipated the admission of
new slave states to the Union.
19. See FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 10, at 193–280.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
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• Art. IV, Sec. 4, through this provision, known as the “guaran-
tee clause,” the United States government promised to protect
states from “domestic Violence,” including slave rebellions.
• Art. V required a three-fourths majority of the states to ratify
any amendment to the Constitution. This Article ensured that
the slaveholding states would have a perpetual veto over any
constitutional changes. The power of this provision in protect-
ing slavery was profound. It effectively prevented any normal
constitutional end to slavery. Had all fifteen slave states that
existed in 1860 remained in the Union, they would, to this
day, in the twenty-first century, be able to prevent an amend-
ment on any subject. In a fifty-state union, it takes only thir-
teen states to block an amendment.
Other clauses provided opportunities for Congress to regulate, or not
regulate, race and slavery. These included, but were not limited to, the
power of Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce and com-
merce with Indian Tribes (one of the few explicit references to race in the
Constitution),21 define piracy and “Offenses against the Law of Nation,”22
raise an army and regulate, train, and arm the state militias,23 provide for
the naturalization of aliens,24 regulate the national capital and other federal
property,25 regulate the Post Office,26 grant patents and copyrights,27 and
admit new states and regulate western territories and acquire more.28 Start-
ing in 1789, Congress began to legislate about slavery and race in all these
areas. As such, Congress was able to shape the Constitution as it affected
black and white Americans.
II. THE TERRITORIES AND SLAVERY
Even before the Constitution was written, the nation faced the question
of whether to allow slaves in the western territories. In 1787, the Congress,
under the Articles of Confederation, passed the Northwest Ordinance,29
which famously banned slavery north and west of the Ohio River,
declaring:
There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in
the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted: Provided, al-
ways, That any person escaping into the same, from whom labor
21. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
22. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
23. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–16.
24. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
25. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
27. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
28. Id. art. IV, § 3, cls. 1–2.
29. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States Northwest of the
River Ohio, 1 Stat. 51 (July 13, 1787) [hereinafter Northwest Ordinance].
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or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original States,
such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to the per-
son claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid.30
The Northwest Ordinance never worked as its authors probably ex-
pected, and as late as the 1840s there were still people held in slavery in
Illinois.31 But from the perspective of public policy and as an assertion of
the power of Congress, it was a powerful statement.
With the ratification of the Constitution it was unclear if this statute
was still viable because it required various actions of Congress, such as the
appointment of the territorial governor,32 which were inappropriate under
the new form of government. Selling land in the Northwest was imperative
to the success of the nation under the Constitution, and the Northwest Ordi-
nance was popular with prospective settlers.33 Thus, early in its first ses-
sion, Congress amended the Northwest Ordinance, which effectively
constituted a repassage of the law.34 Thus, Congress’s first action on slav-
ery was a positive reaffirmation of the power of Congress to regulate—and
even ban—slavery in the western territories.
A year after this, Congress formally accepted the cession of North Car-
olina’s claims to western lands, which would eventually constitute the state
of Tennessee.35 The act promised that the inhabitants of this territory would
have “all the privileges, benefits and advantages set forth in the ordinance
of the late Congress, for the government of the western territory of the
United States,” which was an explicit reference to the Northwest Ordi-
nance.36 However, the statute explicitly rejected the antislavery provision of
the Northwest Ordinance: “Provided always, [t]hat no regulations made or
to be made by Congress, shall tend to emancipate slaves.”37 Here, Congress
explicitly allowed slavery in a new territory. This was not required by the
Constitution. Congress might have banned slavery in the Southwest, as it
did in the Northwest, but it did not.
30. Id. art. VI.
31. See FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 10, at 74–101.
32. Northwest Ordinance, supra note 29, para. 3.
33. See CAMPBELL GIBSON & KAY JUNG, HISTORICAL CENSUS STATISTICS ON POPULATION
TOTALS BY RACE, 1790 TO 1990, AND BY HISPANIC ORIGIN, 1970–1990, FOR THE UNITED STATES,
REGIONS, DIVISIONS, AND STATES, tbl.50 (U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 56, 2002),
http://mapmaker.rutgers.edu/REFERENCE/Hist_Pop_stats.pdf (Ohio had virtually no settlers in
1790; by 1800 there were over 40,000 and by 1810 the new state of Ohio had over 230,000
settlers, which illustrates just how anxious Americans were to move into the Northwest, and the
effectiveness and popularity of the Northwest Ordinance).
34. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50 (an act to provide for the government of the
territory Northwest of the river Ohio).
35. Act of Apr. 2, 1790, ch. 6, § 4, 1 Stat. 106, 108 (an act to accept a cession of the claims
of North Carolina to a certain district of Western territory).
36. Id.
37. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Over the next fourteen years, Congress would admit new free states
(Vermont, 1791 and Ohio, 1803) and slave states (Kentucky, 1791 and Ten-
nessee, 1796) without any controversy or meaningful debate. Meanwhile, in
1799, New York would pass a gradual abolition law, setting the stage for a
slave state to become a free state.38 New Jersey would do the same in
1804.39 Neither of these state acts raised constitutional questions, since all
political leaders and constitutional commentators agreed that the states were
free to regulate slavery within their borders. Thus, the constitutional lesson
from the years before Marbury was that Congress had full authority to regu-
late slavery in the west, and admit or not admit states with or without slav-
ery. Congress would continue to use this power until 1857, when Chief
Justice Taney would hold in Dred Scott v. Sandford that Congress lacked
the power to limit the importation of slaves into the federal territories.40
In 1819, the issue of slavery in the territories arose in the debate over
the admission of Missouri into the Union. In 1820, Congress thought it
settled the issue in the Missouri Compromise.41 But, like a vampire that
refuses to die, the issue came back during the debate over Texas’ annexa-
tion and then after the Mexican War. The Compromise of 185042—what
ought to be called the “Appeasement of 1850”43—was a failed attempt to
solve the problem of what to do with slavery in the western territories ac-
quired in the Mexican War. In 1854, the Kansas-Nebraska Act removed
almost all barriers to slavery in the west, effectively repealing much of the
38. Act of Mar. 29, 1799, ch. 62, 1799 N.Y. Laws 388 (an act for the gradual abolition of
slavery).
39. Act of Dec. 3, 1804, ch. 103, 1804 N.J. Laws 251 (an act for the gradual abolition of
slavery).
40. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
41. Act of Apr. 7, 1820, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 544 (an act for the admission of the state of Maine
into the Union); Act of Mar. 6, 1820, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545 (an act to authorize the people of the
Missouri territory to form a constitution and state government, and for the admission of such state
into the Union on an equal footing with the original states, and to prohibit slavery in certain
territories).
42. The Compromise of 1850 was actually a series of given laws passed separately.  They
are: “An Act: Proposing to the State of Texas the establishment of her northern and western
boundaries, the relinquishment by the said State of all territory claimed by her exterior to said
boundaries, and of all her claims upon the United States, and to establish a territorial government
for New Mexico,” Act of Sept. 9, 1850, Chapter 49, 31 Congress, Session 1, 9 Stat. 446; “An Act:
For the admission of the State of California into the Union,” Act of Sep. 9, 1850, 31 Congress,
Session 1, Chap. 50, 9 Stat. 452; “An Act: To establish a territorial government for Utah,” Act of
Sep. 9, 1850, Chapter 51, 31 Congress, Session 9 Stat. 453; 9 Stat. 453; “An Act: To amend, and
supplementary to, the act entitled “An Act respecting fugitives from justice, and persons escaping
from the service of their masters,” approved February twelfth, one thousand seven hundred and
ninety-three,” Act of Sept. 9, 1850,  Chap. 31, 31 Cong. Session 1; 9 Stat. 453;  “An Act: To
suppress the slave trade in the District of Columbia, Act of Sept. 20, 1850, Chap. 63, 31 Cong.,
Session 1; 9 Stat. 467.  They are discussed in PAUL FINKELMAN, MILLARD FILLMORE 101–125
(2011).
43. See Paul Finkelman, The Appeasement of 1850, in CONGRESS AND THE CRISIS OF THE
1850’S, at 36–79 (Paul Finkelman & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2012) [hereinafter Finkelman,
Appeasement].
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settlement created in the Missouri Compromise.44 This led to the emergence
of the Republican Party, which was dedicated to “Free Soil, Free Labor,
Free Speech and Free Men,” and for a ban on slavery in all the territories.45
In the Compromise of 1850 and the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Congress contin-
ued to exercise the constitutional power that had emerged before Marbury
to regulate slavery in the territories. But, in Dred Scott,46 Chief Justice Ta-
ney found the ban on slavery in the territories in the Missouri Compromise
(and by extension similar bans in other laws) to be unconstitutional. His
sweeping attempt to decide all constitutional issues over slavery in favor of
the South backfired, and helped catapult Lincoln to the White House.47 In
Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney overturned important constitutional policy
that predated Marbury. Significantly, this was the first time since Marbury
that the Court had overturned a federal statute.
III. CREATING A WHITE SOCIETY
During the Revolution, blacks engaged in political activity, served
with the minutemen in New England, and fought for liberty from Great
Britain, serving in state militias and the Continental line.48 During this pe-
riod they voted and petitioned legislatures. The Constitution of 1787 did not
contain the word race, and free blacks voted in at least six states during the
ratification process.49 The Constitution of 1787 did not define national citi-
zenship at the time, and federal citizenship (except for naturalized citizens)
was acquired through state citizenship. Article I of the Constitution, for
example, provided that the right to vote for members of Congress would be
based on the right to vote for members of the state legislature.50 The provi-
sion for the election of the president required that the person be “a natural
born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption
of this Constitution.”51 There was no definition of “natural born Citizen,”
but quickly it came to mean those who were born in the United States.
Anyone born outside the United States was not a citizen at birth, but had to
be naturalized or made a citizen through some legislative act.52 In other
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
47. Finkelman, Appeasement, supra note 43, at 55.
48. See generally BENJAMIN QUARLES, THE NEGRO IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1961).
49. Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal Rights in the Ante-
bellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415, 477 (1986) In 1787, there were no racial restrictions on
voting in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and North Caro-
lina. There is scattered evidence of blacks voting in Maryland and Connecticut as well. Id.
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
51. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
52. The Naturalization Act of 1790 provided that the children of U.S. citizens born outside
the United States, “shall be considered as natural born Citizens” as long as their fathers had
previously lived in the United States. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 104
(presuming that without such a law they were not considered U.S. citizens at birth because of their
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words, the child of a U.S. citizen born outside the United States was not a
“natural born citizen,” but needed an act of Congress to gain citizenship.
The statutes clearly limited the right of naturalization to “any alien, being a
free white person,”53 but this was not required by the Constitution. This
simply underscores the way Congress used its Constitutional powers—in
the case the power “to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization”54—to
indirectly support slavery by creating a racial requirement for naturaliza-
tion. None of these issues directly affected the status of free blacks already
in the nation or those born there in the future. Free blacks were considered
full citizens in some states, citizens with limited rights in others, and clearly
second-class residents in other places.
Despite the lack of any constitutional requirement or guidance, almost
immediately Congress began to use race as a category for benefits and obli-
gations in American society. Here, Congress defined constitutional norms
by using race to limit constitutional rights. While some northern states let
blacks vote and even hold office, at the national level Congress quickly
used its constitutional powers to create a class of non-citizens with dimin-
ished rights for free African Americans. Nothing in the Constitution re-
quired such a policy, but nothing prevented it either.
In its second session, Congress exercised its constitutional power to
“establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”55 Before this, naturalization
was entirely in the hands of the states, which could make people state citi-
zens, either through birth in an American state or through state naturaliza-
tion.56 Through that state citizenship they became U.S. citizens. The 1790
law changed this, but the law also introduced a racial categorization, al-
lowing “any alien, being a free white person” to become a citizen.57 Con-
foreign birth).  In 1795, Congress amended the act, providing that, “the children of citizens of the
United States, born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, shall be considered as
citizens of the United States,” as long as their fathers had previously lived in the United States.
Naturalization Act of 1795, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 414, 415 (illustrating that citizenship for anyone
not born in the United States was subject to Congressional discretion). Subsequent laws would
require that the foreign-born children of U.S. citizens register for their citizenship when they first
entered the United States. At various times, Congress has changed these rules, expanding or con-
tracting the citizenship rights of foreign-born children of U.S. citizens.
53. This language is in all the naturalization acts passed before 1870, when the language is
changed to allow people of African ancestry to be naturalized. Naturalization Act of 1870, ch.
254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
55. Id.
56. See generally JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP,
1608–1870, at 74–105, 173–247 (1978); see also ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING
VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 54–59, 71–76 (1977); Paul Finkelman, Coping with A
New “Yellow Peril”: Japanese Immigration, The Gentlemen’s Agreement, and the Coming of
World War II, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 1409, 1415–1417 (2015).
57. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (amended 1795).
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gress repeated this language in the second Naturalization Act of 179558 and
in a similar act in 1802.59
During the debate over the 1795 Naturalization Act, which continued
the requirement that new citizens be white, there was a brief debate over
slavery. A Republican60 Congressman from Virginia, William Branch
Giles, offered an amendment to prohibit people who had titles of nobility
from becoming naturalized citizens. His goal was to attack New England
Federalists,61 whom he erroneously believed favored such titles. In re-
sponse, Samuel Dexter, a Federalist from Massachusetts, proposed that no
slave-owning aliens could become naturalized citizens, and once natural-
ized, these new citizens would be permanently barred from owning
slaves.62 Dexter’s motion was easily defeated, but it illustrates that slavery
and race were on the table in the early years of constitutional interpretation
and implementation.
The racial limitation on naturalization would remain the law until after
the Civil War, when Congress allowed people of African ancestry to be-
come naturalized citizens.63 In 1790, there were very few African immi-
grants coming into the country, and the slave trade was dormant. Thus,
there could have been no fear of a flood of non-white citizens. But, under
the Constitution, Congress had plenary power to regulate naturalization,
and, as the very first sentence of the act made clear, ensure that the United
States would become a white person’s country. This whites-only provision
of the Naturalization Act was not needed and was not a response to any
actual threat. Rather, it was a statement of policy on race that set a pattern
until the Civil War.
Two years later Congress passed the Militia Act.64 Like the Naturaliza-
tion Act, Congress made race part of the very first sentence of the law,
requiring “[t]hat each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the
respective states, resident therein, who is or shall be of the age of eighteen
years, and under the age of forty-five years” would be “enrolled in the mili-
tia.”65 The law did not specifically prohibit blacks from serving, but it was
applied that way. There was nothing in the Constitution that required this
ban on black military service, and many in Congress, as well as the presi-
58. Naturalization Act of 1795, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414 (amended 1798 and 1802).
59. Naturalization Law of 1802, ch. 28, 2 Stat. 153.
60. Party names in this period are tricky. The party of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison
was, at this time, called the Republican Party or the “Democratic Republicans.” In the 1820s this
Party would be called the Democratic Party, and is the great grandparent of the modern Demo-
cratic Party. From the 1790s until the Civil War it was also the party that most supported slavery.
61. ROBINSON, supra note 9, at 253–254.
62. Id.
63. Naturalization Act of 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256. The law did not allow Asians
to be naturalized. See IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
(1996).
64. Militia Act of 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271, 271.
65. Id.
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dent who signed the bill, were well aware of the gallant service of black
soldiers during the Revolution. For example, at the battle of Yorktown in
1781, General Washington had personally chosen the First Rhode Island to
lead an attack on a key British position, known as Redoubt 10, while French
troops were assigned to attack Redoubt 9. About half the soldiers in the
First Rhode Island were black,66 and most of them had been slaves when
the Revolution began. Alexander Hamilton commanded the attacking black
troops in a magnificent victory that set the stage for the surrender of Corn-
wallis and American Independence.67
By the end of the Revolution, “there were so many black soldiers”
under Washington’s command “that their presence had ceased to be remark-
able to contemporary observers.”68 But the memory of this service was for-
gotten when Congress passed, and Washington signed, the Militia Act of
1792. Although a few blacks would serve in the War of 1812, there would
be no formal enlistment of blacks until August 1862, following the passage
of the Militia Act of that year, which did not have the word “white” in the
law and specifically provided for the enlistment of blacks.69
Congress also used its constitutional power to regulate the Post Office
to develop a racial policy. In this period, Congress often used non-govern-
ment contractors to move mail from one part of the country to another. In
the 1790s, entrepreneurs who had contracts to move mail in the South (mail
contractors as they were called) often used slaves to drive their wagons and
deliver the mail to post offices. Postmaster General George Habersham, a
Federalist from Georgia who served in the Washington and Adams admin-
istrations, noted that slaves had been successfully used as mail coach driv-
ers throughout the South.70 But in 1802, the Jefferson administration, which
was deeply paranoid about free blacks and the slave rebellion in Haiti,71
opposed this practice. On March 23, Postmaster General Gideon Granger
urged Congress to prohibit blacks from being employed to drive wagons or
carriages that carried the mail.72
In his official report to Senator James Jackson, the chair of the com-
mittee that oversaw the Post Office, Granger claimed that the potential for
66. QUARLES, supra note 48, at 81–82.
67. HENRY WIENCEK, AN IMPERFECT GOD: GEORGE WASHINGTON, HIS SLAVES, AND THE
CREATION OF AMERICA 243–248 (2003).
68. Id. at 243.
69. Militia Act of 1862, ch. 201, § 12, 12 Stat. 597, 599 (providing for the enlistment of
African Americans).
70. See RICHARD R. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM FROM
FRANKLIN TO MORSE,138 (1995).
71. See FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 10, at 178–182, 215–216,
250–255 (on Jeffersonian fears of free blacks and slave rebellions).
72. Postmaster General U.S. Gideon Granger, Further Provision for Transporting the Mail
(Mar. 23, 1802), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT 21, 22 (Lawrie &
Franklin eds., Gales & Seaton 1834) [hereinafter Granger, Further Provision for Transporting the
Mail].
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robbery necessitated this change.73 He worried that if mail wagons were
robbed, the slave drivers could not testify against the criminals if they were
white. He told the Senate: “The law ought, in my opinion, to prohibit con-
tractors from entrusting the mail to negroes, or people of color” because in
many states they were “not allowed as witnesses excepted against persons
of color.”74 Thus, “[p]eople disposed to rob the mail” would not be deterred
“by fear of conviction.”75 Since robbing a mail carrier was a federal crime,
and could be prosecuted in federal court, there would have been an alterna-
tive solution—allowing black testimony, even from slaves, in such cases.
But that obvious solution was not likely to gain support from Jackson or
any other southerner in Congress.
The fear of robbery and the problem of black testimony may in fact
have been a pretext for Granger. Thus, the Postmaster General ended his
report by noting: “There are also political considerations which, as this
time, will evince the propriety of such restriction.”76 In a private note ad-
dressed to James Jackson in his capacity as a “Senator from Georgia,” and
not as the chair of the committee on the Post Office, Granger spelled out
these “considerations.”77 He asserted that the “objection” to “employing ne-
groes, or people of color, in transporting the public mails” was “of a nature
too delicate to engraft into a report which may become public.”78 Thus, he
sent this private letter.
In this letter, Granger argued that after the rebellion in Haiti “we can-
not be too cautious in attempting to prevent similar evils.”79 He warned that
if slaves were allowed to travel from place to place delivering mail, it
would “increase their knowledge of natural rights of men and things” while
the travelling “affords them an opportunity of associating, acquiring, and
communicating sentiments, and of establishing a chain or line of intelli-
gence” that could lead to slave rebellions.80 As post riders, Granger feared
blacks would acquire knowledge of geography useful for a rebellion while
at the same time learning that “a man’s rights do not depend on his color.”81
Finally, the Postmaster General noted that as post riders “[t]heir travelling
creates no suspicion; excites no alarm,” and thus “[o]ne able man among
them, perceiving the value of this machine, might lay a plan which would
be communicated by your post riders from town to town, and produce a
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ted that the “hazard may be small,” but he urged legislation to “prevent the
evil” by banning blacks from working for the Post Office.83 As the leading
historian of the U.S. Post Office has observed, “[f]ear of a slave rebellion,
of course, can hardly explain the exclusion of blacks from the postal system
in the nonslaveholding states.”84 But, the desire of the Jeffersonians to se-
cure white supremacy in their slaveholder’s republic was enough to push
for a full ban on black post riders.
It is somewhat ironic that these fears were articulated by a Postmaster
General from Connecticut, where slavery was on its last legs due to the
state’s nearly twenty-year old, gradual abolition act,85 under which no new
slaves had been brought into the state and the children of all slave women
were born free. Thus, the Postmaster General, who was from effectively the
free state of Connecticut, told the senator of Georgia, who fiercely protected
slavery in his political career, how to protect slavery in the South. But
Granger clearly reflected the fears and anxieties of his own boss, President
Jefferson. Whatever the motivation, Granger’s letter to Senator Jackson
worked. Two months later, a new law provided that “no other than a free
white person shall be employed in carrying the mail of the United States, on
any of the post roads, either as a post-rider or driver of a carriage carrying
the mail.”86 The law provided a fifty dollar fine for any contractor who used
blacks, slave or free, to deliver mail.87 Some mail contractors would later be
fined for using slaves as drivers, while at least one employed a ten-year-old
white boy (for very little money) to sit with a slave wagon driver, to effec-
tively evade the law.88
The 1802 law shows that before Marbury the executive and legislative
branches were interpreting and implementing the Constitution to both pro-
tect slavery and oppress the nation’s growing free black population.89 Con-
stitutional law at the ground level had by this time emerged as the law for
white people.
83. Granger, Further Provision for Transporting the Mail, supra note 72, at 27.
84. JOHN, supra note 70, at 141.
85. Gibson & Jung, supra note 33, at tbl.21 (Connecticut passed its gradual abolition act in
1784. The 1790 census found 2764 slaves in the state, but there were only 951 in 1800 and by
1810 there would be only 310).
86. Act of May 3, 1802, ch. 48, § 4, 2 Stat. 189, 191 (repassed in 1810) (an act further to
alter and establish certain post roads; and for the more secure carriage of the mail of the United
States); Act of Apr. 30, 1810, ch. 37, § 4, 2 Stat. 592, 594 (an act regulating the post-office
establishment).
87. Act of May 3, 1802, ch. 48, § 4, 2 Stat. 189, 191.
88. JOHN, supra note 70, at 141.
89. While not huge in absolute numbers, the free black population in the nation was growing
more rapidly than at other times before the Civil War because of a combination of Virginia’s
(temporary) liberalization of private manumission and the dismantling of slavery in the North. The
population statistics, showing the growth of the free black population in the Virginia and the rest
of the nation are conveniently found in CAMPBELL GIBSON & KAY JUNG, supra note 33.
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IV. INTERSTATE COMITY, FUGITIVE SLAVES, AND FREE BLACKS: RACE
EMERGES AS THE “THIRD RAIL” OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution set out provisions to promote
interstate comity and facilitate smooth relations between the states. The first
paragraph of this section obligated the states to give equal “privileges and
immunities” to citizens of other states.90 The second clause obligated the
states to cooperate in the extradition of fugitives from justice.91 The third
clause prohibited states from legally emancipating fugitive slaves from
other states and instead required that such fugitives be returned to their
owners.92 Significantly, none of these three provisions contained any lan-
guage suggesting that the federal government had a role to play in their
enforcement. This lack of explicit federal power contrasts with all the other
sections and clauses of Article IV, which give explicit enforcement power
to Congress or the national government. Thus, Sections 1 and 3 of Article
IV provide for explicit Congressional action, while Section 4 obligates the
“United States” to act to guarantee the states have a “Republican Form of
Government”93 and to protect them from “domestic Violence.”94 Neverthe-
less, despite the lack of any authorization of congressional power, in 1793
Congress passed an extradition act that applied to both fugitives from jus-
tice and fugitive slaves.95 This was an example of Congress interpreting the
Constitution expansively to protect slavery and in the process to undermine
the liberty of free blacks.
A full analysis of this law is beyond the scope of this article.96 But it is
important to see that the 1793 law offered virtually no due process protec-
tions for alleged fugitive slaves, allowing the removal of an alleged fugitive
after a summary process, where the evidence was based entirely on what the
slaveholder or the slaveholder’s agent presented to a magistrate or judge. In
such a hearing, alleged slaves were often not represented by counsel. Under
this law someone could be condemned to a lifetime of bondage without a
trial of any kind. Significantly, anyone interfering with the return of an
90. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privi-
leges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”).
91. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 (“A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other
Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the execu-
tive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having
Jurisdiction of the Crime.”).
92. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (“No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be dis-
charged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom
such Service or Labour may be due.”).
93. See generally WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1972).
94. Id.
95. Fugitive Slave Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302.
96. See FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 10, at 102–132 (for a history
of the origin and passage of this law).
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alleged fugitive could be fined five hundred dollars (an enormous sum at
the time) and be subject to six months in prison.97 For northern free blacks,
this law seemed to legalize kidnapping. Arguably, this law violated the pro-
tections in the Bill of Rights, which guaranteed a jury trial to anyone in
federal court, and that the legal process of determining the status of a per-
son as a slave or free person required protections found in the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments. In this sense, the return of a fugitive slave was not like
the extradition of a fugitive from justice, because someone charged with a
crime in another state would be given a jury trial in that state. But, an al-
leged fugitive slave would be simply sent to the person claiming the slave.
Under this law, which was arguably not even authorized by the Constitu-
tion, a free black in the North could be deprived of “liberty” without due
process of law, as required by the Fifth Amendment.
The 1793 law emerged out of a dispute between Pennsylvania and Vir-
ginia over the extradition of three white men accused of kidnapping a free
black in Pennsylvania.98 When Virginia officials refused to extradite the
kidnappers, the governor of Pennsylvania, Thomas Mifflin, wrote directly
to President Washington for help.99 The correspondence eventually went to
Congress, which responded with the extradition law of 1793.100 While Con-
gress thought it fixed the problems set out in the correspondence between
Pennsylvania and Virginia, the law was inadequate for the task. After the
law was passed, Virginia still ignored Pennsylvania’s extradition requisition
and the three men who were wanted for kidnapping a free black resident of
Pennsylvania would never be returned for prosecution.101 Thus, the north-
ern states were unable to protect their free citizens from being kidnapped
and could not obtain the extradition of anyone who did kidnap free
blacks.102 However, slaveowners could now call on state and federal judges
and magistrates to help them recover fugitive slaves.
In the 1790s, two debates in Congress over the protection of free
blacks in the new nation illustrate how race affected the shaping of the
97. Fugitive Slave Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302.
98. See FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 10, at 102–132 (discussing a
detailed history of this controversy and the adoption of the 1793 law); see also Paul Finkelman,
The Kidnapping of John Davis and the Adoption of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, 56 J. SO.
HIST. 397 (1990).
99. See FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 10, at 102–132.
100. Fugitive Slave Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302.
101. See FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 10, at 102–132.
102. See Paul Finkelman, The Protection of Black Rights in Seward’s New York, 34 CIV. WAR
HIST. 211 (1998) (starting in the 1830s and continuing until the Civil War, northern governors
would refuse to extradite free blacks accused of helping slaves escape to the North); PAUL
FINKELMAN, States’ Rights North and South in Antebellum America, in AN UNCERTAIN TRADI-
TION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 125 (Kermit L. Hall & James W. Ely,
Jr. eds., 1989); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66 (1861) (just before the Civil War, the Supreme
Court reluctantly confirmed the right of state governors to refuse to extradite fugitives from
justice).
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Constitution. The history shows that the early Congress used its powers
only to support slavery and deny protection for free blacks. Put another
way, the Congress only wanted to “establish Justice . . . and secure the
Blessings of Liberty,”103 to protect the liberty of whites to own blacks but
not to protect the liberty of free blacks.
The first debate involved a request from Delaware to help that state
prevent the kidnapping of its free black residents and the kidnapping (or
stealing) of slaves who were then sold out of state. This debate might be
seen as the first step on the road to Congress’s endless nineteenth century
debates over slavery and race. The debate was caused by an innocuous re-
quest from a slave state (Delaware) to prevent the kidnapping of free blacks
and also to prevent people from stealing slaves and selling them outside of
the state. There was something in it for northerners (protection of freedom)
and for southerners (protection of slave property). In the abstract, the most
committed slaveowners could not endorse kidnapping free blacks, even if
they did not think any slaves ought to be manumitted. Similarly, even the
most committed opponents of slavery—and there were few around at the
time since the only anti-slavery organizations in the country were state soci-
eties focused on ending slavery at the state level—would not have objected
to prosecuting people who stole slaves to resell them, especially since some
of these stolen slaves were being exported to the West Indies.
Federalists should have supported Delaware because legislation on this
subject would have strengthened the national government, while Jeffersoni-
ans might have acquiesced on the grounds that the plea for help came from
a state and legislation would have improved interstate harmony. But, de-
spite the mild goals of the proposal, slaveowners and even some northerners
responded in ways that suggested the impossibility of ever having a serious
and calm discussion of slavery and race with southern politicians.
Delaware was a slave state and would remain one until after the Civil
War. But, it had a rapidly growing free black population and a declining
slave population. In 1790, there were about 8900 slaves in the state and
3900 free blacks, and by 1800 (four years after this debate) the state would
have 6200 slaves and 8300 free blacks.104 The state liberally allowed pri-
vate manumission and had strict rules to prevent selling slaves to other
states. In 1793, Delaware passed new legislation to prevent the kidnapping
of free blacks and the illegal sale of slaves from the state.105 But, enforce-
ment was difficult. Delaware was sandwiched between two slave states—
New Jersey (which would not begin to end slavery until 1804) and Mary-
land—and located close to Virginia. With an enormous coastline and an
equally long border with Maryland, it was easy for kidnappers to take
103. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
104. Gibson & Jung, supra note 33, at tbl.22.
105. Act of June 14, 1793, ch. 22, 1793 Del. Laws 1093 (an act to punish the practice of
kidnapping free negroes, and free mulattoes, and for other purposes).
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blacks (free or slave) out of the state. Thus, the state turned to Congress for
help.
In April 1796, Congressman Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania, at the
behest of the Delaware legislature, asked Congress to pass legislation to
prevent “the future kidnapping of negroes and mulattoes.” Gallatin acted
because Representative John Patten from Delaware was ill.106 He proposed:
“That the Committee of Commerce and Manufactures be instructed to in-
quire into the propriety of making effectual provision for preventing the
kidnapping of negroes and mulattoes, and of carrying them from their re-
spective States contrary to the laws of the said States.” Congress agreed and
sent the resolution to the appropriate committee.107
In December, Representative John Swanwick of Pennsylvania reported
a bill back from the committee. The debate revealed a Congress reluctant to
use its constitutional powers to protect free blacks. The Federalist represen-
tative from Connecticut, Joshua Coit, who would normally have supported
enhanced national power on an issue of trade, commerce, tariffs, or bank-
ing, suddenly doubted that Congress should readily expand its constitu-
tional powers. He suddenly wanted to defer to the states on this issue,
noting that “[i]t appeared to him that the laws in the several States were
fully adequate to the subject.” While he admitted that kidnapping free
blacks was an “evil,” he feared federal legislation would be “a greater
evil.”108 This was perhaps a legacy from Connecticut’s alliance with the
Deep South on the African slave trade vote at the Constitutional Conven-
tion. Indeed, on the first important vote over the slave trade, the Connecti-
cut delegation had provided the winning margin for South Carolina’s
demand that the slave trade be protected from congressional interference for
twenty years.109 Coit concluded that the committee report “was a very lame
one.”110
Edward Livingston, a Jeffersonian Republican from New York also
expressed doubts about congressional power. Like Coit, he agreed kidnap-
ping was evil but wondered how Congress could remedy it.111 This was
consistent with the Jeffersonian hostility to a stronger national government
as well as the proclivity of northern Jeffersonians to support the South on
issues involving slavery.112
The hostility from southerners was more direct and intense. William
Vans Murray, a Federalist from Maryland, mocked the whole idea, claiming
106. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 1025 (1796).
107. Id.
108. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1730 (1796).
109. FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS, supra note 10, at 22–29.
110. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1731 (1796).
111. Murray, William Vans, (1760–1803), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=M001119 (last visited Oct.
30, 2017).
112. Id.
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he did “not rightly understand the meaning of the word” kidnapping and
asked if it was “the intention of the Committee to have reference to the
taking of free negroes and selling them as slaves, or the taking slaves to
make them free.”113 Murray, who had studied law in London,114 obviously
knew what kidnapping was, but he apparently saw nothing evil about
snatching free blacks, or at least it was not important enough for Congress
to worry about it. Murray’s position is almost a precursor of the notion
articulated six decades later by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney (who was also
from Maryland) that blacks, even when free, were “so far inferior, that they
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”115 William L.
Smith of South Carolina wanted to “get rid of the business altogether.”116
He considered it an “entering-wedge” for a full debate on slavery, was
“alarmed” by the discussion, and “did not think [the] Constitution allowed
[the] House to act in it.”117 Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina agreed with
this position, asserting the “impropriety of the measure.”118
A few northerners defended the proposal. Isaac Smith pointed out that
the kidnappings involved federal issues because blacks from Delaware were
being taken to the West Indies and that it “was impossible that the existing
laws of the States should prevent this fraudulent practice.” Smith, who was
from New Jersey where slavery was still completely legal, had no doubt a
law preventing such practices would “in no way” be contrary to the Consti-
tution and believed “it could give no offense or cause of alarm to any
gentleman.”119
Samuel Sitgreaves of Pennsylvania defended the proposal, and de-
nounced Murray for “satirizing” a serious issue. He argued that it was “hon-
orable” for the legislature to pass a bill “to prevent free men from being
kidnapped.”120 He noted that if there was a problem with people kidnapping
slaves to free them, “he was willing to join” the southerners “to correct
it.”121 This was a response to southerners, like Murray, who believed that
northerners were stealing slaves—“kidnapping” them—in order to free
them.
Representative Murray responded to Sitgreaves by reiterating this
point. He asserted that the real problem was “the false philosophy and mis-
placed philanthropy of the advocates of emancipation” who were trying to
free slaves.122 Significantly, Murray, like the other southerners, refused to
113. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1731 (1796).
114. Murray, supra note 111.
115. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
116. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1731 (1796).
117. Id. at 1731–1732.




122. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1734 (1796).
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even consider the possibility that free blacks actually were being kidnapped.
This differed considerably from northerners like Sitgreaves who were will-
ing to deal with that problem as well.
Significantly, those representatives sympathetic to the Delaware peti-
tion were effectively arguing for a redesign of the Fugitive Slave Law to
protect free blacks from kidnapping while at the same time protecting the
rights of masters to recover their fugitives. There was certainly constitu-
tional space for a revised law that would have protected free blacks from
kidnapping and criminalizing the interstate or international transportation of
stolen slaves or kidnapped free people. If southerners had been interested in
compromise along these grounds they might have actually gained a law that
would have helped recover fugitive slaves while also protecting free blacks
from kidnapping.
But many southerners wanted no part of any compromise. South Caro-
lina’s William Smith reiterated that the whole discussion was dangerous
and unconstitutional, and that one of the Northern delegates “had gone too
far to make use of the word emancipation.”123 (It is worth noting that Rep-
resentative Murray had used that word in his speech, but this did not appar-
ently bother Smith, since Murray, like Smith, opposed protecting free
blacks). Representative Smith insisted that “the General Government”
should not “intermeddle with the States’ policy; it might cause very consid-
erable contests and injury. He hoped it would drop altogether.”124
In the end, the House sent the bill back to committee, where it would
eventually die.125 Congress passed no law to prevent kidnapping of free
blacks. Almost all of the southerners and many northerners did not see a
constitutional (or political) role for the federal government in helping to
prevent the interstate or international transportation of kidnapped free
blacks. On the other hand, the Fugitive Slave Law, which provided a federal
role in the return of slaves who sought their own freedom, remained on the
books.
Various members of Congress tried to increase penalties under that
law for people who helped fugitives.126 Indeed, on the same day the House
tabled the bill to prevent kidnapping, William Van Murray proposed a fine
of five hundred dollars for anyone who hired a fugitive slave.127 This bill
was tabled but later sent to a committee for further consideration.128 But
unlike the bill to protect free blacks, no one doubted the constitutionality of
a law to protect slave property. In the debate over Delaware’s request for
help to protect its black residents from kidnapping, the responses of Repre-
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1735.
125. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1767, 1985–1996 (1797).
126. ROBINSON, supra note 9, at 290–302.
127. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1740 (1796).
128. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1767 (1797).
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sentatives Murray, Macon, and William Smith illustrated the extent to
which the slaveholders of the nation insisted on shaping the Constitution to
protect their interests and only their interests.
About a month after Congress debated the Delaware proposal, Repre-
sentative Swanwick presented the House with a petition from four free,
black residents of Philadelphia, where Swanwick lived.129 The petition and
the debate that followed, which took up nine pages of the Annals of Con-
gress, underscores the growing hostility to black rights in this period.
The four blacks, originally from North Carolina, petitioned Congress
to protect their freedom. Their Quaker masters in North Carolina had
manumitted them, and a state court had confirmed their freedom.130 But
some people in North Carolina questioned the legality of the manumissions
since the state allowed former slaves to remain in the state only if their
manumissions were for “meritorious service” (or if there was a special act
of the legislature approving the manumission). A North Carolina law of
1741 required that any slave manumitted by an owner leave the state within
six months, unless liberated for “meritorious service.”131 This statute re-
mained in force after the Revolution with some modest changes. A 1788
law reminded North Carolinians that private manumission required proof of
meritorious service, and declared that any blacks still in the state who had
been manumitted for other reasons could be apprehended by the sheriff or
by private parties, who would then be compensated when the now re-en-
slaved blacks were auctioned off.132
In 1796, the North Carolina legislature reaffirmed the validity of the
1741 law asserting:
That no slave shall be set free in any case, or under any pre-
tence whatever, except for meritorious services, to be adjudged of
and allowed by the county court, and licence first had and ob-
tained therefor; and that such liberation when entered of record,
129. Id. at 2015–2017.
130. See generally HIRAM H. HILTY, TOWARD FREEDOM FOR ALL: NORTH CAROLINA
QUAKERS AND SLAVERY 31, 41, 75 (1984) (mentioning Quakers as the people named in the peti-
tion); Mark A. Huddle, Quaker Abolitionists, NCPEDIA, (Jan. 1, 1996), https://www.ncpedia.org/
culture/religion/quaker-abolitionists; see also Small Account Book with Expenses of Phineas
Nixon While on the Voyage of the Sally Ann from Beaufort to Haiti, 1826, in MANUMISSION SOC’Y
OF N.C. RECORDS, 1773–1845 of the SO. HIST. COLLECTION, http://finding-aids.lib.unc.edu/02055
(follow “folder 12: Small account book with expenses of Phineas Nixon while on the voyage of
the Sally Ann from Beaufort to Haiti, 1826” hyperlink to view digitized scans).
131. Act of Apr. 4, 1741, ch. 24, § 56, 1741 N.C. Laws 161, 173, reprinted in 1 A COLLEC-
TION OF ALL THE PUBLIC ACTS OF ASSEMBLY OF PROVINCE OF NORTH CAROLINA NOW IN FORCE
AND USE (1751).
132. Act of 1788, ch. 20, 1788 N.C. Laws 450 (amending an act to prevent domestic insurrec-
tions). A 1795 law authorized the arrest of free blacks who “conduct themselves so as to become
dangerous to the peace and good order of the State and county.” Such free blacks could be re-
quired to give security for future good behavior or sold into slavery. Act of 1795, ch. 16, § 4, 1795
N.C. Laws 79, 80. From the petition to Congress, it is not clear if the petitioners were also fearful
of this law.
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shall vest in the said slave, so as aforesaid liberated, all the right
and privilege of a free born negro, anything in the said act to the
contrary notwithstanding.133
Since the petitioners no longer lived in North Carolina it is not clear if
this law even applied to them, and if it did, whether it overrode the grant of
freedom previously affirmed by local courts.
The petitioners detailed these facts, noting that while in North Carolina
some people had tried to re-enslave them, that some of them had been
jailed, and that they had been forced to leave North Carolina, and eventu-
ally they all moved to Pennsylvania. All of them claimed their experience in
North Carolina deserved congressional protection because they asserted
they had in fact been legally manumitted. Although Pennsylvania was a free
state, they feared being captured under the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 and
the being returned to North Carolina. They left the state, first going to Vir-
ginia and then moving to Pennsylvania, which was rapidly ending slav-
ery.134 In 1780, Pennsylvania passed the nation’s first law to end slavery,
and by 1790 there were only 3700 slaves in the state and over 6500 free
blacks. By 1800, there would be about 1700 slaves in the state but more
than 14,500 free blacks, as the state became a haven for manumitted slaves
from other states.135
The debate in the House over this petition revealed, once again, the
conflict over the meaning of the Constitution and congressional power with
regard to slavery, race, and state powers. Southerners were almost apoplec-
tic over the petition. Thomas Blount, who was from North Carolina, in-
sisted the Congress should never receive the petition and asserted the
petitioners were actually still slaves and should be returned under the Fugi-
tive Slave Law of 1793. John Heath of Virginia was equally “convinced”
the petitioners “were slaves.”136 Heath argued that “[i]t appeared to him to
be more within the jurisdiction of the Legislature of that State; indeed, the
United States had nothing to do with it.”137 James Madison agreed “it did
not come within the purview of the Legislative body” and thought it was a
judicial matter for the state of North Carolina.138 The “father of the Consti-
133. Act of 1796, ch. 5, § 1, 1796 N.C. Laws 88, 88 (an act to amend, strengthen and confirm
the several acts of assembly of this state, against the emancipation of slaves).
134. ROBINSON, supra note 9, at 288.
135. Gibson & Jung, supra note 33, at tbl.53. See generally ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST
EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH (1967) (on the end of the slavery in
Pennsylvania); PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY
46–69 (1981); GARY NASH & JEAN SODERLUND, FREEDOM BY DEGREES: EMANCIPATION IN PENN-
SYLVANIA AND ITS AFTERMATH (1991); Paul Finkelman, Human Liberty, Property in Human Be-
ings, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 53 DUQUESNE L. REV. 453 (2015).
136. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2020 (1797).
137. Id.
138. Id.
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tution,” who was also the owner of more than one hundred slaves,139 had no
interest in seeing Congress consider any freedom claims. He was smart
enough to avoid a debate over the merits of slavery but fell back on the
limits of federalism and the power of the states to determine the status of
people in their own jurisdiction. But, Madison’s position missed the point.
If the petitioners were actually free, then it would be wrong to have them
transported to North Carolina, where they still might be enslaved or kid-
napped. Because they were in Pennsylvania, it would have been reasonable
for the Pennsylvania courts to determine if they should be sent back to
North Carolina if someone claimed them. Madison was certainly creative
enough to see a solution through a modification of the Fugitive Slave Law
that would have provided reasonable due process for blacks who alleged
freedom. But Madison and the other southerners would have none of this.
A number of northerners thought that the petition should be sent to a
committee because it raised serious issues about freedom and “[a] claim to
the humanity of the House” to protect free people from kidnapping.140 But,
the southerners were inflexible, arguing that this was an issue “on which the
House has no power to legislate.”141 In the end, the House refused to even
accept the petition, much less consider the problem it raised. Any discus-
sion of the rights of free blacks or their protection was toxic—the eight-
eenth century equivalent of the third rail of constitutional politics. The
adamantly proslavery William Smith of South Carolina vigorously asserted
that he did “not think [the members of the House] were sent there to take up
the subject of emancipation.”142 In the end, his colleagues agreed.
This debate once again underscored how the Constitution was being
shaped. The slave states could demand and get protection for their property.
That was within the scope of congressional power, even where, as in the
Fugitive Slave Clause, the structure of the Constitution seemed to preclude
such power. In reality, as this debate showed, the southerners were arguing
that they could impose obligations on Congress and the northern states, but
Congress could not intervene on “[a] claim to the humanity of the
House.”143
139. See RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY (1970) (noting that Madison’s
slaveholding “grew rapidly; [and] by 1782 there were at least 118 [slaves]”). In 1801, Madison
paid taxes on 108 adult slaves, but this figure would not have included children or adults consid-
ered too old to work. JAMES MADISON’S MONTPELIER, SLAVERY INTERPRETATION MANUAL 59
(2017).
140. 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 2021 (1797).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2023.
143. Id. at 2021.
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V. SLAVERY IN THE NEW NATIONAL CAPITAL: A SLAVEHOLDER’S CITY
FOR A SLAVEHOLDER’S REPUBLIC
The decision to move the national capital from Philadelphia to Wash-
ington, DC in 1800 led to Marbury.144 The case, as we all know, was about
the appointment of a justice of the peace in Washington County, in the new
District of Columbia, under the Organic Act for the District of Columbia,
formally titled “An Act Concerning the District of Columbia.”145 Congress
passed this law under its powers “To exercise exclusive Legislation in all
Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as
may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, be-
come the Seat of the Government of the United States.”146 There were no
constitutional issues with this law, since Congress clearly had plenary
power to enact it.
The new capital consisted of two counties—Washington and Alexan-
dria—that had been ceded to the nation by Maryland and Virginia. Wash-
ington was on the Maryland side of the Potomac River and constitutes the
present national capital. Alexandria was on the Virginia side of the river
and is today the city of Alexandria, Virginia.  (In 1846 Congress would
return this part of the District of Columbia to Virginia.)147 Because of Mar-
bury we remember the Organic Act for the clause dealing with justices of
the peace, but the law also had important implications for slavery in the
new national capital. In the debates of the 1790s, southerners like William
Smith of South Carolina had argued that slavery was entirely a state matter
and that Congress should not even discuss the subject—except of course to
discuss how to recover runaway slaves. But, if Congress was precluded
from considering slavery, what would happen to slaveowners in the national
capital?
Both Virginia and Maryland were slave states, and there were already
slaves being held in what had become the new capital. Congress cleverly
avoided a debate over the issue without even mentioning slavery. Section
one of the Organic Act provided that:
the laws of the state of Virginia, as they now exist, shall be and
continue in force in that part of the District of Columbia, which
was ceded by the said state to the United States, and by them
accepted for the permanent seat of government; and that the laws
of the state of Maryland, as they now exist, shall be and continue
144. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
145. Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 11, 2 Stat. 103, 107 (an act concerning the District of
Columbia).
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
147. Act of July 9, 1846, ch. 35, 9 Stat. 35 (an act to retrocede the County of Alexandria, in
the District of Columbia, to the State of Virginia).
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in force in that part of the said district, which was ceded by that
state to the United States, and by them accepted as aforesaid.148
Under this provision the District adopted all of the laws of slavery for Ma-
ryland (in Washington County) and Virginia (in Alexandria County). Once
established, Congress and the district government would adopt other laws to
regulate slavery,149 while federal courts, including the US Supreme Court,
would interpret these laws.150 In cases coming out of the District, the US
Supreme Court would always interpret the laws of Maryland and Virginia
to protect slaveowners. This often meant ignoring Maryland or Virginia
precedent, practice, or even the exact wording of state statutes.151
Thus, quietly, indeed silently, and with no debate or constitutional
questions raised, slavery crept into the national capital, and the United
States officially became a slaveholder’s republic. It would remain that way
until 1862, when Congress would exercise its plenary powers to govern the
District of Columbia by abolishing slavery there.152
VI. THE CONSTITUTION AND SLAVERY IN THE EARLY PERIOD
As I noted at the beginning of this article, my goal here has been to
demonstrate the three things about our early constitutional history. First, it
was not court centered. In the 1790s, Congress and the executive branch
made constitutional law as they interpreted, constructed, and implemented
the Constitution.
Second, this article shows that slavery was a controversial constitu-
tional issue from the very beginning of the nation. In our own times, this
matters. We live with the legacy of slavery and racism. Civil rights and
equality are at the center of our national debates. Racism profoundly affects
our economy, educational systems, access to health care, and criminal jus-
tice system. It also affects our foreign policy. To deny this is to ignore the
reality of American society. I would argue that to understand and solve
148. Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 11, 2 Stat. 103, 103–105.
149. See, e.g., A Member of the Washington Bar, The Slavery Code of the District of Colum-
bia, Together with Notes and Judicial Decision Explanatory of the Same (1862) (this nineteenth
century pamphlet is an example of slave laws in the District of Columbia); WORTHINGTON G.
SNETHEN, THE BLACK CODE OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1848), reprinted in M. THOMPSON,
ABSTRACT OF THE LAWS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (3d ed. 1855).
150. Sylvia v. Coryell, 23 F. Cas. 591 (C.C.D.C. 1801) (No. 13, 713) (this is the first case to
deal with slavery. The court refused to rigorously enforce a Virginia law which prohibited the
import of slaves into the state. Had the Court enforced the law, the slave, Sylvia, would have
gained her freedom).
151. See, e.g., Scott v. London (Negro), 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 324 (1806); Scott v. Negro Ben, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 3, 4, 6 (1810); Hezekiah Wood v. John Davis, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 271 (1812);
Mima Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290 (1813). I discuss all these cases in chapter 2 of
PAUL FINKELMAN, SUPREME INJUSTICE: SLAVERY IN THE NATION’S HIGHEST COURT (forthcoming
2018).
152. Act of Apr. 16, 1862, ch. 54, 12 Stat. 376 (an act for the release of certain persons held to
service or labor in the District of Columbia). See generally KATE MASUR, AN EXAMPLE FOR ALL
THE LAND: EMANCIPATION AND THE STRUGGLE OVER EQUALITY IN WASHINGTON, D.C. (2010).
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these issues requires Americans to deeply interrogate their own history.
This includes the Founding period.
Thus, this article raises important issues about modern constitutional
interpretation, and what is generally called “intentionalism.” Slavery was at
the heart of many constitutional debates before Marbury. Protecting slavery
was also a central aspect of the drafting and adoption of the US Constitu-
tion. Those scholars and judges who profess to support “original intent”—
however they define it—must come to terms with a Constitution and early
constitutional law that was designed and implemented to protect slavery
and support a nation for white people only. They need only look at the laws
passed in the 1790s and the debates in the Constitutional Convention and in
Congress to realize that the modern United States cannot emulate or be
proud of the original intent of many of the framers and the Founders, espe-
cially on issues of slavery, race, and equality. The early Congress, filled
with founders, including James Madison, chose over and over again to pro-
tect slavery and to reject any discussion of freedom or emancipation. Repre-
sentative Smith of South Carolina argued the House could not even debate
these issues. And, he carried the House on this point. Whether we like it or
not, protection of slavery and a rejection of liberty was the intention of
many Framers in 1787, and they successfully carried this argument into the
government in the 1790s and beyond. The Founding generation created a
slaveholder’s republic, and it is a legacy that has bedeviled the United
States for more than two centuries. This legacy is surely a caution on how
we view their “intentions” and whether we should venerate them.
